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Municipalunions may often use their ownvotesand those ofsympathetic
fellow citizens to promote increases indemand for municipal services.
If successful, this strategycan increase member employment levels
withoutsacri.ficingcompensation Municipal employeeunjonjzatsig—
nifcmntIy increases levels of annual manhoursand employment per
capita, and reduces annual hours of workper employee. The net effect of
average unionization levels is to increase employeesper capita by at
least 4.7,, and manhoursper capita by at least 3.3/., over levels that
would prevail in the absence ofmunicipal unions. These effects occur
almost entirely in functions withrecognized bargaining units. In these
functions, employment levels are at least 9.9Yhigher than they would be




Flushing,NY 11367A Bostonfirefighter and two Boston Housing Authority p01 ice
officers were among seven men indicted yesterdayin connection
with an arson ring alleged to have set 163nighttime fires
during 1982-83 in an attempt to force pub] Icofficialsto hire
more p01iceand firefighters." Boston Globe, 26 July 1984.
Unions in the private sector place positivevalue on member employment
as well as on member compensation. However, privatesector unions in-
crease only compensation. They restrict labor andoutput supplies in
order to increase wages, at the same timeencouraging substitution of
nonlabor factors for union members, and reductionsin total output. In
consequence, private sector unions have negligible or negativeeffects
on employment.
Union control over labor supply and output levelscontributes to
union power in the local public sector,as well. These unions also
exercise influence over output demand. Arson by firemenis, presumably,
among the most extreme techniQues b> which municipalerncloyees generate
demand for the services they provide. More often,local public sector
unions promote their services to other citi2ens throughpolitical ac-
tivities, and encourage members to exercise theirownfranchisein favor
of service expansions. Municipal unionsare distinctive both for these
strateges and for the results they obtain; the> increasemunicipal
employment, as well as compensation levels.
Thefirst sectjoro thisstudyexplores the relationships between
union activity and employment levels. It demonstrates thatequilibrium
employment levels should increase unions can stimulate demand for
output. it alsodemonstrates that ord nan 1>, union ernp I oyrnentefectsshould increase with union strenQth.
The second section presents rearessions which etirrae that ernpJ'—
ment per capita in municipal functions with average uricn characteris-
tics is, atrninirriurn, 4.7> greater than in functions lacHngunioniza—
tion. However1 only the strongest municipal unions achieve significant
employment gains. Employment in municipal functions represented by
recognized bargaining units is at least 9.9< greater than in unorganized
functions. This nearl' matches the 1O.7 increase in tctal compensation
per hour worked obtained in these same functions. These employment gains
are plausibly the result of increases in output demand they are nearly'
matched by increases of ?.7Y in manhours of service per capita.
I.Unionization andEmployment
Localpublic sector employees often promote general increases in demand
for their services. They are frequently constituents as well as
employees of their local governments. They are thereby entitled to a
voice in the determination of demand for their own servces. In add—
flon, other members of their community may because of their expertise,
respect their opinions with regards to appropriate service levels. In
consequerrce, local public sector employees are likely to have important
influence on output demand. They should be able to use this influence to
improve their own job security through increases in local public sector
employment.
—2--A. Employment and Output Demand
Local pubHc sector workers employ a numberof techniques in the exer—
cisc o-f their influence. Arson with the intentto stimulate demand for
protective services is both the leastsavory and the least common.
Teacher campaigns for increased teacher—studentratios and police cam-
paigns for larger patrol car teams are examples ofmore common tech-
niques. These campaigns serve twopurposes; theyareat once civic—
minded attempts to arouse interest in thequality of public service, and
strategies to improve public employee job security.
More generally, local public sectoremployees can wield substantial
political power. They are a powerful lobby formany reasons; they are
numerous, they take an active interest inmany government decisions,
their interests are well—defined, andthey are familiar with the manner
in which government business is conducted.The extent o-f their abil ity
toaffect public policy through dailyoccupational interactions, labor
relations negotiations and politicallobbying with elected public offi-
cials is unknown. However, as anexample, estimated effects of local
public employees on public spending referendaare impressive.
As a specific example, the Boston Globe of4 September 1981 reported
(pg. 16) 111n a press conference yesterday, EdwardO'Reilly (Presi-
dent of the Boston Firefighter's Association)charged Boston Mayor
(Kevin H..) White and Boston Fire CornrnisionerGeorge H. Paul with
misleading the public on the issue of fire safety and saidhe wanted
all 116 (recently) laid off firefightersrehired to provide 'minimum
-fire protection for the city'." (pg. 16) O'Reillymade his remarks
at the site of a fatal multiple—alarm fire.
— —Grarni ich/Rubinfeld (1982b) report that local pubi Ic sector employees
In Michigan were more likely to vote in a referendum on budget 1 imita—
tions than other citizens and more likely to vote for increased levels
of government revenues and expenditures. LaddA4ilson report similar
results for Massachusetts. These authors estimate that public employee
votes accounted for 5—7 of the difference between votes for and against
limitations. The vote of public employees, themselves, in elections that
concern them probably underestimates their total influence. They may
also generate considerable support from people not on publ Ic payroll.
Barnum./Helburn examine the results of Texas referenda over the
ieal status of public sector bargaining. They report that, in cities
where police and fire functions cooperated in promoting legalized bar—
gaining, the total vote in favor was increased by 15.
Union—induced increases in demand for local public services should
increase derived demands for employment, and equilibrium employment
levels, if production functions, elasticities of factor and output
supply are unexceptional. The success of local public sector employees
in this strategy depends on their level- of organisation. Organized
employees can more effectively encourage demand for public services,
because their political activities are better coordinated. Organized
employees can more effectively take advantage of increased demands for
labor, because they can control labor supply.
simple model of surplus maximization demonstrates that local public
sector unions can increase equilibrium employment levels If they can
stimulate demand for output. Local governments choose capital and labor
—4—levels to maximize the difference betweenrevenues and costs subject to
production functions, known demands for output, fixedprices for capital
and union—determined wages for labor. Unionsset wage demands on the
basis of their bargaining strength. Theymay also influence levels of
output demand, with the extent of influenceagain dependent of strength.
Formally, q represents output levels, K gives the levelof capital
employed, and L gives the level of labor employed.Output is produced




where o<p < •2
Demand for output is a log—linear function ofoutput price p, and
consumer income y. Demandalso depends on a multiplicative function f




TheCobb—Douglas production function is commonly used torepresent
production in the local public sector. BorcherdinQ/Deacor,and
Grarni ich/Rubinfeld (1982a) are examples.
This form j commonly used to represent demandfor local public
goods (Mieszkowskj,'Stejn, Bergstrom./Goodmar,Borcherding/Deacon and
Grarnl ich/Rubjn.feld (1982a)). Local publicQocds are effectivel>'
private goods in consumption (Bergstrom/Goodman,Bcrcherding/Deacon
and Grarrlich'Rubjnfe1d (1982a)).
——with a2, a3 > 0. Unionshaveno effect on demand in the absence of
organization ——a1(0)
I ——the>'have either no or potive effects ——
?1 ——and either fixed or ncreasinQ effects jr union strength
——
a1'(u)￿ 0.
Costs depend on the price of capitalr, and wages. The waQe demanded
by unions, w(u), is an increasing function of union strength. LuJaqesare
set at competitive levels in the absence of unions w(O)=w,Local
public sector employers maximize surpluses,
p<q)q —w(u)L—rK
:3:
subjectto equations I and 2.
These equations give optimal local public sector employment levels in
natural logarithms as:
lnLe1 lnr+$2lnw(u)
In this model, as in the private sector models of Oswald,
Blair/Crauiford, Dertouzos./Pencavel, Farber (1978> and Pencavel
<1984a), unions are restricted by labor demands. They may set wages,
but employers are free to choose surplus—maximizing employment
level s.
Niskaner, demonstrates that public manager; seek to maximize the
difference between budget allocations and the costs of providing
service under typical bureaucratic incentive structures. Inman
(1982) and Ott adopt this objective function in their appi icat ions.
-6—a3





01 =— a2'a21) (1—P) < 0 if a2 > 1
and
02 =a2(1-P(1-a2))< 0
Optimal local pub] ft sector employment is a neqative function ofwages,
a negative function of capital prices if output demand is elastic, anda
positive function of demand characteristics. 6 In particular,pubi ft
sector employment is a positive function of union—induced increasesin
public service demand, a1(u).
Equation 4 predicts that local public sector unions may be able to
increase employment1 as well as wages, above levels which wouldprevail
in the absence of employee organization through their influenceon
6
symmetrical condition gives optimal capital levels.7
public service demand.Beneck and Inman (1981) report prel irninary
evidence which supports this prediction. Benecki finds positive employ-
ment effects of municipal unions in a large sample of small cities.
However, these effects are absent or reversed in his three samples of
larger cities. Inman finds positive union employment effects for police
and 'fire functions in a small sample of big cities. The results reported
in the next section demonstrate that municipal unions increase employ—
rnent, as well as compensation levels, in a large sample of American
cit I es.
The derivative of equation 4 with respect to u, union power,
demonstrates that public unions with greater influence over output
demand will often enjoy greater employment gains than will those with
less
LlnL I U I ULw










Here, is the elasticity of public service demand and 1)isthe elas—
7
Courant/Gramlich./Rubinfeld also present a model in which, within a
broad range of activity, local public employees can raise their oi.n
employment levels. Theirs is a general equil ibrium model, with its
emphasis on redistribution through local government. In contrast,
the partial equil ibrium approach adopted here emphasizes the produc-
tion of local public services.
-8--tic it>' ofwageswith respect to unionization, Unionpower tends to
increase employment levels through induced increases inoutput demand,
but also to reduce employment through employerreactions to compensation
increases. Equation 5 states that optimalemployment levels increase
with u if output demand is sufficientlymore elastic with respect to u
than are wages. This is morel ikely to be thecase when labor is
prominent in the production function ——Pis high ——becauseproduction
increases require large amounts of additional labor.It is also more
likely if output demand is insensitive toprice ——islow ——because
equilibrium output levels need not fall dramatically whenemployers
increase prices to cover union compensationgains. Both these conditions
are likely to hold for local public services.
Previous studies do not offeranyevidence with regard to the irn—
plicatior,s of equationS. Differences inunionstrength and elasticities
of local public output demand withrespect to union power have not been
measured. The next section uses a new categorization ofunion strength
(Zax) to test these implications indirectly: Ifmunicipal union strength
does not have a signif icant, posit ive relatlonship with un ion employmm t
effects, than municipal unions do not substantially alter demandfor
muri icipal services.
8
Bergstrom.'0oodman and Grami ich/Rubinfeld (1982a) reportprice or tax
share elastic ties of demand for munictpal servicesbetween zero and
—1. Mieszkowsk i/Stein conclude that a value of—.5is representative
ofmost estimates. Borcherdirig,/Deacorestimate marx elasticitiesir thesame ranqe,thouQh they also report elasticitiesless than —1 forsomemunicipal services.In 1980.municipal expendituresfor
salaries and tages represented47.9> of totalgeneralexpenditure
'Bureau of the Census:).
—>'—B. Employment andEfficientContracts
Positive union effects on local public sector employment are one
manifestation ofunioninfluence or the demand for local public services.
However, positive effects do not prove conclusively that unions stimu-
late demand. Union employment effects could possibly be positive as the
result of union activity on the supply side of the local public service
market; if local public sector employment conditions a'e inefficient in
the absence of unions, and unions negotiate efficient contracts. The
empirical evidence presented in the next section does not address this
issue directly. However, comparisons between union employment eects in
the private and public sectors sucqest that it is probabi unimportant.
Unions affect employment levels throuh the supply of output with
monopoly control over labor supply. In the exercise of that control,
they may aspire to any bargain which does not preclude employment ——any
bargain under which total employment costs do not exceed the total value
of employee product.
Union gains may be taken as increases in wages, employment, or both.
The value of employee product may itself, depend upon union be-
havior. Employers, under union provocation or with union coopera-
tion, may alter their supply behavior in output markets so as to
increase profits. Unions can encourage employers to exercise monopo-
ly power <i.4arren—Boulton), assist employers to collude in output
markets (Maloney/HcCormick/Tollison), arid encourage government
protection for cartels <this issue is one of many discussed in
Simon). If these initiatives alter output supply functions,
employers will alter their derived demands for labor.
—10—The allocation of union gains dependsupon relative preferences of
unions and employers for the two, and on thebargaining process. Collec-
tive bargains will always set wage levels at or above thoseset by the
competitive market. In simple monopoly models of unionism, increased
wages imply reduced employment. However, employment under efficient
bargains will typically exceed competitive levels, as well.
Unions have no effect on efficient employment levels inonly the
special case where union objective functions depend exclusivelyon wage
levels.
10
Here, the labor demand function is also the contractcurve.
If union objective functions depend positivelyon employment levels, as
well as wages, the contract curve must lie to theright of the demand
curve in employment—wage space. Uiith this specification of unionobjec-
tives, the union effect on efficient employment levels isunambiguously
positive; at any wage, efficient levels of employment exceed levels
employers would choose unilaterally.
Union objective functions depend significantlyon employment levels
10
Fellner discusses this case at length.
For example, Hal l/Lilien construct a model witha vertical contract
curve the efficient employment level, at any wage, is identical
with that established under competitive labor marketconditions. In
this case, efficient employment levels underemployee unionization
exceed those preferred by employers, though not those set under
competition. McDonald/9olo discuss a model in which the contract
curve must be positively sloped. Here, efficient employment levels
not only exceed levels preferred by employers atany wage greater
than the competitive level, but always exceed levelsestablished ir
competitive markets, as well.
—11 —in all empirical studies of private sector union behavior.
12Studies of
unions in the local public sector would almost certainly reveal similar
objectives. If this were the case, and local public sector unions were
able to negotiate efficient contracts, they would increase local public
employment levels regardless of their effects on public service demand.
In practices efficient contracts are probably infrequent. Most
analyses of private sector union behavior assume that collective bar-
gains are riot efficient, regardless of union preferences for employment.
There is little private sector evidence of efficient employment
levels. Actual union employment effects appear to be negligible or
negative. Freernan/Medoff assert that, during the 1970's, unions
sacrificed employment in return for increased compensation (pg. 249).
12Farber (1978) finds evidence that the United Mine Workers union is
strongly risk averse. In the context of his model, risk aversion
implies positive valuation of employment levels. Dertouzos/Pencavel
find that erriploxrnent enters positively, with varying weights, into
the objective functions of all eight International Typographical
Union locals studied. Pencavel (1984a) finds positive elasticities
of substitution between wages and employment in most estimates of
union objective function characteristics, based on a pooled sample
of ten International Typographical Union locals. Farber (1984) cites
several other studies in support of these results.
13Dunlop originally assumed that the range of union choice was
restricted to wage/employment combinations on the ernployers demand
curve for labor. Oswald supports this restriction with the assertion
that cooperative solutions, such as those required to obtain effi-
cient outcomes, are difficult to enforce. Blair/Crawford agree, on
the theoretical argument that union objective functions do not yield
well—defined maxima along employer isoprofit curves, and on the
practical argument that actual contracts leave the employer free to
choose employment levels. Dertouzos./Pencavel, Farber (1978) and
Pencavel (1984a), while demonstrating positive union preferences for
employment, adopt this restriction and enforce negative employment
effects. More generally, Farber (1984) argues that unions and
employers may be limited to inefficient contracts bx internal union
p01 itics and enforcement difficulties. Pencavel (1984b) suggests
that observed grievance levels are higher than would be expected
under efficient contracts.
—12—Freeman states "In the private sector it is universally accepted that
one of the substantial responses to union wage effects is a reduction of
employment.' (pg.
14
The political nature of bargaining in the
local public sector distinguishes it from private sectorbargaining.
However, there is no compelling argument to expect that the local public
sector will be a favorable environment for the negotiation of efficient
labor contracts, where the private sector is not.
Explanations of positive union emplo>ment effects in the local public
sector as evidence of efficient contracts must be based on thespecula-
tive proposition that public sector labor markets are distinguishedby
unusual cooperation in bargaining between employer and employee. Posi-
tive union effects on output demand are the more plausible explanation
of positive union employment effects. This explanation is consistent
with the analytical and anecdotal evidence of local public employee
Union employment effects are the subject of veryfewstudies. Farber
<1984:) does not discuss employment effects in hissurvey.l4essels
asserts that empirical findings of moderate substitutability in
production between labor and capital, largepositive union wage and
productivityeffects imply larger negative union employrrent effects
than have been commonly estimated. Pencavel/Hartsog find small,
generally unimportant negative effects of unions on manhours ir
aggregate data covering 1920—80. However, as Jonathan Leonard has
pointed out, their regressions include relative output levels as
exogenous variables. The effects they estimate represent substitu—
tonpolitical activity. It is based on a fundamental distinct onbetween
public and private sector employment; private sector employees are
factors of production, but public sector employees are constituents, as
well
II. Municipal Employment and Union Strength
This section investigates theeffectsofmunicipal unionization or
manhoursper 10,000 capita, employees per 10,000 capita and annual work
hours per employee in the police, fire, sanitation, and other non—
educational functions of 839 American cities.
16Observations on func-
tions in 1975, 1977 and 1979, pooled across functions and years, com-
prise the sample for statistical purposes. All result; are taken from
15
There is little evidence, analytical or anecdotal, of positive
private sector union effects on output demand. Boycotts are probably
the most dramatic of the explicit strategies private sector unions
adopt to affect total demand for the goods they produce. The im-
mediate purpose; of these actions are to reduce rather than increase
demand. Union label and anti—import campaigns are the most prominent
union efforts to increase demand for their own production. These
strategies only encourage substitution of union for nonunion and
foreign output. They have not been sufficiently successful to dis-
suade students of union activity from implicitly assuming that total
demand for output is independent of union behavior.
16
The municipal employment measure; analyzed here are drawn from three
identical surveys of municipal employment and compensation, con-
ducted in 1975, 1977 and 1979 by the International City Management
Association (Friend and Pike, Friend and Bencivenga, Friend arid
Lufkin). These survey; report numbers of full—time employees, stand-
ard work schedules, vacation time, sick leave and compensation
expenditures for employees in police, fire, sanitation, and all
other noneducational departments. Eight hundred and thirty—nine
cities provide complete records for at least one function in one
year.
—14—ordinary least squares (OLS) regression equations withone of the three
employment measures as dependent variables, andmeasures of municipal
unionization among the independent variables. 17
These equations are, effectively, reduced formsof the structural
equations for municipal labor markets. In addition tounionization
measures, they include as exogenous variables extensivemeasures of city
population characteristics, city governmentstructure, employment condi—
18 - tions,and geographic division. Respectively, these *our groups O*
independentvariables capture variations across cities inoutput demand
conditions, government behavior, private sector alternativesto
municipal employment, and region—specific effects.
Previous studies of municipal labor relationstypically represent
unionization by a single measure oforganization, bargaining, or con-
tract status. Zax identifies a hierarchy of'unionization' in municipal
functions which more effectively measuresvariations in union strength.
This hierarchy includes six degrees ofmunicipal unionization ma
function, based on the interactions between organization inthat func-
tion and in other functions of the samemunicipality. Functions are
'unorganized' if no employees belong to unions,'organized' ifsome
17
All regressions reported here includedummy variables for functions
and years.
These variables are taken from Censusses ofPopulation, Censusses
and Surveys of Government, and surveys ofgovernment structure
conducted by the International City ManagementAssociation. Further
details with regard to the sample are containedin an Appendix,
available from the author. It contains thecomplete equation es-
timates from which the results reported hereare reproduced.
—belong to a union or employee associations 'organized with a bargaining
unit' if a union is recognized for bargaining purposes, and 'organized
with a contract' if a collective bargaining agreement exists. For
brevity, municipalities are designated as 'bargaining' if employees in
any function of the municipality are represented by a bargaining unit.
These cities are probably in states which prohibit public sector collec-
tive bargaining. Municipalities are 'non—bargaining' if no employees are
represented by a bargaining unit. By definition, public sector bargain-
ing is legal in these cities.
Two degrees of unionization occur in non—bargaining cities. Unor-
ganized functions in non—bargaining cities are unambiguously non—union,
the weakest degree. The second degree, organized functions in ron—
bargaining cities, is the simplest form of union structure. If state law
denies unions the right to obtaining recognition, this degree repr€'sents
the strongest permissible form of unionization in these municipalities.
Employment in functions of this degree should be greater than in non-
union functions.
Unorganized functions in bargaining cities represent the third degree
of municipal unionization. The relative strength of unions in the second
and third degrees is uncertain. Unorganized functions in bargaining
cities can threaten to acquire recognition as a bargaining unit. t the
same time, they are the weakest form of unionization where bargaining is
legally permitted. Empirically, Zax demonstrates that compensation
increases obtained by unorganized functions in bargaining cities are
indistinguishable from those obtained by organized functions in non—
—16-bargaining cities.
Organized functions in bargaining cities, the fourth degree of
unionization, are stronger than the lower degrees because these func—
tions can credibly threaten to obtain recognition. The fifthdegree of
unionization, organized functions with bargaining units, iscomprised of
municipal unions which have obtained legal recognition. Theiradvantage
over lower degrees is the entitlement to negotiate withmunicipalities
over terms of employment. The sixth and strongest degree includesonly
organized functions with contracts. Terms of employment foremployees in
these functions are legally protected. Bargaining units andcontracts
can exist, by definition only in bargaining cities UniOn Str th
increases rnonotonically across the four degrees inbargaining cities.
Employment effects should increase commensurately.
The specification of unionization in the equationsreported here
consists of four dummy variables. The first degree,unorganized func-
tions in non—bargaining cities, is not represented.Degrees two through
four are each represented by one dummy variable. The fifthand sixth
degrees, functions with bargaining units and functions with contracts,
are pooled in a single dummy ——underthe heading 'bargaining units' ——
becauseno source reports contracts for all functions on a function—
spec ific basis.
19
19Empirically, dummYvariablesforgeographic divionsprovide addi-
tional controls for legal status. Geographic and unionization
dummies adequately account for state—specific ef-fects; coefficients
reported here for union dummies are unchanged when divisional
dumrriies are replaced b dummy variables foreachstate.The equations reported here will underestimate positive effects and
overestimate negative effects of municipal unionization on municipal
employment levels. Municipal cornpensaticin measures are not entered
explicitly into the equations, because they aredetermineds.irnul—
taneouslywith employment levels. Compensation levels in degrees two
through five are significantly greater than in degree one, non—union
functions (Zax). Compensation increases won by unions will force
municipalities up their demand curves for labor, reducing employment in
order to control total labor costs. These reductions, as well as the
direct effects of unionization on employment, will be captured by the
dummy variables for unionization.
Table I presents estimates of union effects on three measures of
employment levels for each degree of unionization. Bargaining units have
strong effects on manhours per capita, employees per capita and annual
work hours per employee. Individual coefficients for other degrees are
usually insignificant. However, the pattern of significance in the
differences between these coefficients further confirms the hypotheses
of the previous section.
Bargaining units, the strongest measured degree of municipal
unionization, are the only degree in which employment per capita is
significantly increased. F—tests demonstrate that bargaining unit ef-
fects on employment and manhours per capita are significantly different
—lB—3.615 * 1.965*
(5.19) (10.4)
Notes:Absolute t—statistics are in parentheses. Totalcompensation
effects are reproduced fromZax.Triple asterisks indicate coeffi—
cientssignifjcant at l0, double asterisks indicate significance at
5, single asterisks indicate significance at 1/..
Table 1.
OLS Absolute Union Effects of Four
Degrees of Municipal Unionization










































from those in other degrees of unionization at the .O1Y level. 20Unions
in this degree also reduce annual hours of workper ernployeesubstan—
tially, by forty hours, or one full work week. This effect,though
larger than that for other degrees, is not significantly different from
that obtained by in any degree of unionization withinbargaining cities.
Employment effects in other degrees are usually insignificant. The
comparisons between effects in different degrees are revealing,
20
Details of these and all other F-tests are available frorrithe
author.
- —nevertheless. F—tests show no significant differences in union effects
on manhours per capita, employment per capita, and annual work hours per
employee between organized and unorganized functions in bargaining
cities. Equal it>' in reduced—form employment effects may, in fact, be
evidence that organized functions obtain employment increases above
levels for unorganized functions in these cities. Compensation increases
in the former siqnificantly exceed those in the latter. Other things
equal, barQaining municipalities should react to these differences in
compensation effects by reducing employment further in organized than in
unorganized functions. Organized functions may use their greater in-
fluence over demand for output to compensate.
21
F—tests also demonstrate that coefficients on organized functions in
non—bargaining cities are significantly different, at 5>'., from those on
unorganized functions in bargaining cities, for all three measures of
labor quantities. These tests and the coefficient values indicate that
organized functions in non—bargaining cities have more strongly positive
effects on all three measures of employment, in addition to similar
compensation effects. pparently, the advantages of organizing, where
barQaining is prohibited, outweigh those of only threatening recogni-
tion, where it is permitted.
These results sugQest that the legal right to bargain is as much a
21
Sanitation functions are a greater share of these unionization
categories than of the sample as a whole. Though the equations
contain dummy variables for each function, these results may capture
some element of spillovers from better—organized p01 ice and fire
functions.
—20—challenge as a benefit to municipal employees. The exercise of thfs
right, as represented b bargaining units, leads to employmentand
compensation levels which exceed those under any other circumstances.As
shownby the comparison of employment and compensation effectsbetween
organized functions in non—bargaining cities andunorganized functions
in bargaining cities, this right becomes a liability if it isnot exer—
c ised.
Total Compensation4.O6< ** 4.817* 8.22/ *
PerHour Worked
Note; Asterisks indicate elasticities derived fromcoefficients
significantly different from zero at 5X (see table 1).
1O..7 *
Table 2 restates the absolute union effects of TableIaselas—
ticitfes, percentages of degree—specific means. Elasticitieseriphasize
the relative strength o-f bargaining units.Organized functions in bar—
—.1 -
Table 2.
OLS Relative Union Effects of Four
Degrees o-f Municipal Unionization






























5.O2 —6.08 —B.43Y 9.87,< *gaining cities enjoy compensation increases of 8.2Y., but may suffer
reductions in employment per capita of up to 8.4Z. Functions with bar-
gaining units obtain employment increases of at least 9.9, as well as
compensation increases of 1O.7'..
Elasticities also reveal that work—sharing is not the source of
employment gains. Bargaining units reduce annual hours of work per
employee by more than 27, but increase employment per capita by nearly
1O<. These effects, combined, represent an increase in nanhours of
service per municipal resident of nearly 87.. To the extent that employ-
ment gains estimated for organized functions in non—bargaining cities
are meaningful, they are also attributable to increases in service
level s.
These estimates of degree—specific union employment effects are
entirely consistent with the hypothesis that employmert increases are
won through stimulation of output demand. Stronger unions more success-
fully reduce employment losses or obtain employment gains, within both
bargaining and non—bargaining municipalities. In addition, employment
gains are always associated with increases in manhours of service per
capita. These facts, while not inconsistent with the hypothesis that
municipal unions negotiate efficient contracts, are not predicted b'
contemporary characterizations of such contracts.
Table 3 presents estimates of aggregate municipal union effects on
manhours per capita, employment per capita and annual work hours per
—Table 3.
Aggregate Absolute and Relative Union
Effects on Municipal Employment Levels
Employment
Measure Absolute Effect Relative Effect
ManhoursPer 1733. 3.34<
10,000 Capita
Employees Per 1.30 4.73
10,000 Capita
Annual Work —24.9 —1.29X
Hours Per
Employee
Total Compensation $.581 7.50
Per Hour Worked
Notes: Total compensation estimates are taken fromZax.
municipal employee. These estimates are sums of the absolutedegree—
spec if ic effects, weighted by the proportion of all functions in each
degree. Aggregate relative effects are aggregate absoluteeffects as
proportions of aggregate means.
These estimates show that, on net,average levels of labor relations
activity in a function and in a city increase manhoursper capita by
more than 3>'., and employment per capita by nearly 5>'.,over levels that
would obtain in the absence of any unionization.Average levels of




The empirical results inthispaper demonstrate that municipal unions
which achieve recognition as bargaining units are able to increase
municipal employment levels. Theoretically, municipal unions could
achieve these effects by negotiating efficient contracts, unconstrained
by municipal demand curves 4cr labor. However, the evidence here sug-
gests that they are more likely to arise from the abil ity of municipal
unions to stimulate demand for municipal services. Private sector unions
do not have positive employment effects. While there is no reason to
believe that municipal unions are more adept at achieving efficient
contracts than are unions in the private sector, there is persuasive
anecdotal evidence that municipal unions exercise distinctive influence
over demand for their output. This difference between public and private
union effects on output demand could give rise to the contrast between
public and private union employment effects.
Benecki and Inman <1981) report similar, but less definitive
results. Benecki does not analyze individual compensation levels.
Inrnan finds positive union effects on p01 ice employment, no effect
on police wages, positive effects on fire employment and a positive
effect of marginal significance on fire wages. Both measure
unionization with a single variable: Benecki uses athe percentage of
employees who are organized for negotiating purposes". Inman uses
"the percent of workers who belong to a union or employee organiza-
tion which negotiates a labor contract.
—These results cast some doubt over estimates ofmunicipal labor
demand elasticities. Estimates are misleading in thepresence of posi-
tive municipal union employment effects,regardless of the mechanism
throuQh which these effects are Qenerated. 14municipal ities and
municipal unionsaqreeto efficient contracts, observed compensationand
employment levels are probably not on the municipality'sdemand curve
for labor, at all.
If, as seems more lkely municipal unions stimulatedemand for
municipal output, estimated elasticities of labor demandprobably under-
state true elasticities. The elasticityimpl led be equation 4, holding
only the rental price of capital and consumer incomeconstant, is:
in L I Ina1(u)>$,. in w(u) 2 ln w(u)
a2
The second term is positive, because w(u) anda1(u) are both increasing
functions of u. This expression demonstrates that estimatedelasticities
are less negative than are true elasticities if union effectson output
demand are neglected. ctual employment levelsare less sensitive to
union—inducedwage increases than are employment levels given by labor
demand functions, because they are preservedthrough union—induced
increasin output demand.
Theseresults emphasize the dual nature ofmunicipal employment.
Municipalunions represent both employees of the municipal government
andar important municipal constituency. Positive unionemploymenteffects may derive largely from this second role, HoiAjever, this
relationshipcannot be definitively establ shed without direct evidence
of union effects on output demand. The anecdotes which provide what
evidence is currently available need to be augmented by econometric
studies from whichmorerobust conclusions rniqht be drawn.
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